Backtests
Every test uses company figures from quarters that had ended at least 90 days before each decision, in the form they were later filed (including any restatements), with prices adjusted for splits and dividends. Where we chose anything, we chose it with a fixed rule on 2010–2017 and judged it on 2018–2026, the years it had not seen. All tests use today's listed companies only: firms that failed or were taken over are missing, which flatters results. We show results that disappoint as plainly as ones that work.
- Priced inBuying what the market is too pessimistic about, on five valuation lenses, since 2010.
- Combining signalsEleven fundamental signals, hedged against the market, sectors and styles: can they reach a Sharpe ratio of 1?
- Combining strategiesMixing every strategy, each sized by its risk: does the mix beat simply holding the S&P 500?
- RankingsBuying the top 100 of each ranked list every quarter, against the S&P 500.
- Published strategiesThirty-six strategies from the research literature, tested against the bar researchers set for a new finding.
- Insider tradesDo company insiders' own purchases and sales tell you anything? Awards and exercises for comparison.
- Congress tradesWould copying each member of Congress have beaten the S&P 500, once trades were disclosed?
Can combining signals reach a Sharpe ratio of 1?
In plain English: not even on the years we used to pick them. On the years that followed, no. Choosing the signals that had worked in 2010–2017 gave a combined portfolio with a Sharpe ratio of 0.63 over those years. From 2018 to 2026, the same rules managed 0.04: +0.0% a year, with much bigger swings. A fall like that is what overfitting looks like, and why we judge every strategy on years it was not chosen on.
| Portfolio | 2010–2017 (signals chosen here) | 2018–2026 (unseen) | Whole period, after 20 bp a trade | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return a year | Sharpe | Return a year | Sharpe | Evidence | Return a year | Sharpe | |
| Best signals from 2010–2017shares in issue falling, net buybacks, gross profitability | +2.4% | 0.63 | +0.0% | 0.04 | No reliable evidence t = 0.12 | +0.4% | 0.10 |
| All eleven signals, no choosingEvery signal, equal weight: nothing picked with hindsight. | +0.6% | 0.19 | +1.8% | 0.23 | No reliable evidence t = 0.67 | +0.1% | 0.06 |
| S&P 500, buy and holdFor scale: it includes the market's own rise, which these portfolios hedge away. | +14.0% | 0.87 | |||||
Each signal on its own
In 2010–2017 the signals' quarterly results had correlations from -0.37 to 0.77 (average 0.14, 0.27 ignoring sign). The chosen signals (shares in issue falling, net buybacks, gross profitability) had an average correlation of 0.28 with each other, higher than the signals overall, so combining them adds less than their number suggests. 5 of the 11 signals had a lower Sharpe ratio after 2017 than before.
| Signal | 2010–2017, a year | Sharpe | 2018–2026, a year | Sharpe | Evidence, 2018–2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross profitabilitychosenGross profit over total assets | +1.6% | 0.36 | +2.5% | 0.39 | No reliable evidence t = 1.13 |
| Cash-flow gapGrowth our cash-flow model assumes above the growth the price implies (priced in) | +0.9% | 0.31 | +2.1% | 0.38 | No reliable evidence t = 1.12 |
| Earnings gapThe same on net income (priced in, P/E) | +0.3% | 0.09 | +2.0% | 0.38 | No reliable evidence t = 1.12 |
| Shares in issue fallingchosenChange in the share count over a year: buying back beats issuing | +2.1% | 0.75 | +1.6% | 0.26 | No reliable evidence t = 0.75 |
| Net buybackschosenCash spent on buybacks less stock issued, as a share of market value | +1.3% | 0.62 | +1.2% | 0.23 | No reliable evidence t = 0.66 |
| Low accrualsProfit backed by cash: net income less operating cash flow, over assets | −0.5% | -0.12 | +0.5% | 0.14 | No reliable evidence t = 0.41 |
| Low asset growthTotal assets change over a year: slower growers have done better | −1.1% | -0.31 | +0.7% | 0.14 | No reliable evidence t = 0.40 |
| Free cash flow yieldFree cash flow over the last year as a share of market value | +0.1% | 0.04 | −0.0% | 0.04 | No reliable evidence t = 0.12 |
| Earnings surpriseLatest quarter's earnings per share against a year earlier, over its usual spread | +0.5% | 0.31 | −0.1% | 0.00 | No reliable evidence t = -0.01 |
| Cash conversionOperating cash flow over net income | +0.2% | 0.08 | −0.6% | -0.14 | No reliable evidence t = -0.41 |
| Improving return on equityReturn on equity now against a year earlier | −0.4% | -0.14 | −1.2% | -0.32 | No reliable evidence t = -0.95 |
How the test works, and its limits
- Hedged. Each quarter, among about 1,451 companies worth at least $300m, every signal is ranked. The ranks are adjusted so the portfolio holds no net sector, size, 12-month price momentum or market (beta) bet, then $1 goes long for every $1 short. What is left is the signal's own return.
- What was known then. Figures from quarters ending at least 90 days before each rebalance, as later filed (restatements included, a known limitation: a few percent of quarters were revised). Total returns; Sharpe ratio is return over its swing, with nothing subtracted because the shorts pay for the longs.
- Chosen, then tested. "Best signals" follow a fixed rule: positive with a t-statistic above 1 in 2010–2017. The rule is re-applied whenever the data are corrected, and never looks at 2018–2026.
- Early years are thinner. Fewer companies have full records in 2010–2012 (about 479 a quarter at the start against 1,451 on average).
- Earnings surprise. The 90-day delay means the surprise is three months old when bought; the known effect plays out in the weeks after the filing, so this test cannot capture it.
- Costs and survivors. About 44.5% of the portfolio changes each quarter; a cost above 37 basis points a trade would have wiped out the gain over the whole period. Today's companies only: firms that failed or were taken over are missing. Not investment advice.
Can combining strategies beat the market?
In plain English: no. A strategy mix can have a higher Sharpe ratio than any of its parts only if the parts are unrelated and each still works. Every strategy here looked strong in 2012–2017, when even the S&P 500 managed a Sharpe ratio of 1.82 on quarterly returns. From 2018 the market-neutral mix returned −2.1% a year (Sharpe -0.15), and adding it to the S&P 500 gave 0.52 against 0.75 for the index alone. Nothing we tested kept a Sharpe ratio above 1 after 2017; simply holding the S&P 500 had the best Sharpe ratio over the whole period.
| Strategy | 2012–2017 | 2018–2026 | Whole period, Sharpe | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A year | Sharpe | A year | Sharpe | Worst fall | ||
| S&P 500, buy and hold | +14.4% | 1.82 | +15.2% | 0.75 | -23.9% | 0.94 |
| S&P 500 with a trend rule | +12.1% | 1.48 | +8.2% | 0.47 | -20.0% | 0.75 |
| Priced-in long-short, cash flowmarket-neutral | +5.5% | 1.13 | +1.5% | 0.19 | -23.8% | 0.38 |
| Priced-in long-short, earningsmarket-neutral | +5.1% | 0.90 | +1.3% | 0.17 | -26.2% | 0.37 |
| Combined signals (market-neutral)market-neutral | +0.1% | 0.03 | +0.7% | 0.13 | -28.4% | 0.10 |
| Best insider strategy, market hedgedmarket-neutral | +7.2% | 1.02 | +2.6% | 0.24 | -26.1% | 0.39 |
| A: the four market-neutral strategies mixedmarket-neutral | +6.9% | 0.97 | −2.1% | -0.15 | -31.1% | 0.21 |
| B: trend-timed S&P 500 plus A | +19.5% | 1.57 | +5.6% | 0.26 | -38.1% | 0.65 |
| C: S&P 500 plus A | +22.1% | 1.95 | +12.0% | 0.52 | -41.7% | 0.83 |
Would buying the rankings have paid?
Each quarter since 2010, the top 100 of each list as it stood then, in equal amounts, against the S&P 500 bought and held. Today's companies only (failed and acquired firms are missing, which flatters the lists), and fewer companies qualify in the early years. Size and profit alone are not an edge: none of the lists beat the market by more than chance would explain once its market risk is allowed for.
| List | Return a year | S&P 500 | Sharpe | Beta | Extra after market risk (alpha) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Largest US companies by revenue | +15.0% | +14.0% | 0.91 | 0.93 | +1.8% No reliable evidence |
| Most profitable US companies | +13.8% | +14.0% | 0.87 | 0.92 | +0.8% No reliable evidence |
| US companies with the most free cash flow | +14.9% | +14.0% | 0.94 | 0.91 | +2.0% No reliable evidence |
| Fastest-growing large US companies | +15.5% | +15.1% | 0.74 | 1.29 | −2.6% No reliable evidence |
| US companies with the highest profit margins | +12.3% | +14.0% | 0.70 | 1.02 | −1.6% No reliable evidence |
| US companies with the highest return on equity | +14.4% | +14.0% | 0.76 | 1.14 | −1.0% No reliable evidence |
| Biggest share buybacks by US companies | +16.0% | +14.0% | 0.96 | 0.97 | +2.2% Some evidence |
| Biggest dividend payers in the US | +12.9% | +14.0% | 0.85 | 0.81 | +1.3% No reliable evidence |
| US companies with the most cash | +15.0% | +14.0% | 0.83 | 1.08 | +0.2% No reliable evidence |
| US companies with the most debt | +13.2% | +14.0% | 0.82 | 0.88 | +0.8% No reliable evidence |
| Biggest R&D spenders in the US | +20.1% | +14.6% | 0.98 | 1.21 | +2.8% No reliable evidence |